Ukraine’s proximity to Moscow means that Putin will never give ground to Zelenskyy

Ukraine’s proximity to Moscow profoundly shapes President Vladimir Putin’s approach to the ongoing conflict and his resistance to giving any ground to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Several factors drive this dynamic:

• : Russia has traditionally viewed Ukraine as a vital buffer protecting its western flank. Moscow sees control or influence over Ukraine as crucial to its own security and regional dominance12.

• : Putin’s strategy is rooted in the belief that Russia, as a great power, is entitled to a privileged sphere of influence in former Soviet territories, and Ukraine—given its proximity—is central to this worldview1.

• : Any concession to Ukraine could encourage similar resistance in other neighboring states, undermining Moscow's model of regional control1.

• : Russia’s position at recent peace talks reflects an uncompromising attitude. Moscow demands international recognition of its control over Crimea and four eastern Ukrainian regions, and insists on limitations to Ukraine's military and guarantees of non-NATO alignment—terms Ukraine refuses34.

• : Despite heavy sanctions, military losses, and Western diplomatic pressure, Russian sources indicate that Putin remains determined to achieve his objectives, undeterred by international pressure or negotiations56. Russian forces continue to amass near the Ukrainian border, signaling ongoing plans for aggression rather than withdrawal78.

• View on Zelenskyy and the West: Putin’s track record demonstrates an insistence that Russia alone can determine Ukraine’s fate. Concessions are viewed, not as gestures of compromise, but as weaknesses to be avoided19.

• : Ukraine’s closeness to Russia’s capital intensifies Kremlin security anxieties. Any shift in Ukraine’s alignment toward the West is perceived by Putin as a direct threat to Russia’s core interests2.

• : The prospect of NATO on Russia’s borders further hardens Moscow’s stance and discourages any loosening of influence over Kyiv23.

Conclusion

Given these strategic and psychological calculations, it is unlikely that Putin will voluntarily cede meaningful ground to Zelenskyy, regardless of Western mediation or battlefield setbacks. Control over Ukraine is not simply about territorial gains for Moscow; it is about historical identity, security, and the projection of Russian power in a zone it considers existentially vital123.

1. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putin-fears-most/
2. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/natos-new-russia-strategy-requires-better-understanding-threat-moscow-and-how-counter
3. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-talk-about-peace-are-still-far-apart-2025-06-02/
4. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/5/ukraine-war-intensifies-as-peace-talks-appear-at-dead-end
5. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/putin-unfazed-by-trump-will-fight-could-take-more-ukraine-2025-07-15/
6. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/24/putin-tantalises-ukraine-with-a-truce-but-rejects-ceasefire-on-the-ground
7. https://abcnews.go.com/International/putin-prolonging-ukraine-war-zelenskyy-after-trump-peace/story?id=119845834
8. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/putin-planning-fresh-ground-invasion-ukraine-warns-zelensky/
9. https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2025/06/05/ukraine-reveals-russias-larger-war-strategy-00390707
10. https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/5404775-vladimir-putins-growing-red-tide-in-eastern-ukraine/
11. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_negotiations_in_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine
12. https://www.prio.org/2024/11/putins-three-escalations-affect-prospect-of-peace-in-ukraine/
13. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/08/28/demystifying-the-enemy-putins-geopolitical-calculus-and-the-war-in-ukraine/
14. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/a-pro-putin-peace-deal-in-ukraine-would-destabilize-the-entire-world/
15. https://globalnews.ca/news/11177083/ukraines-zelenskyy-wants-putin-face-to-face-talks/
16. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-make-restart-russia-ukraine-ceasefire-negotiations
17. https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-summer-2022-issue-no.21/the-causes-and-consequences-of-the-ukraine-war
18. https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-trump-to-announce-ukraine-weapons-plan-as-un-chief-visits-washington-12541713
19. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine
20. https://www.russiamatters.org/blog/3-years-later-what-russias-aggression-ukraine-has-cost-it-and-what-its-gained